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iv 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(k)(1994). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There are four issues presented on appeal. The standard of 
appeal of each is the same and is presented below. 
1. Whether the warranty deed by which plaintiff/appellant 
Maxwell (^Maxwell") conveyed certain property (the "property") to 
Trendland, Inc. (^Trendland") obligated her to bring any actions 
to recover the property in her own name. Plaintiffs' Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Opposition Memorandum"), filed in case below (Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 
920901881); Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Transcript") in case below, held before the Hon. Tyrone E. 
Medley on March 25, 1995, page 7. 
2. Whether Maxwell suffered damages because of her 
obligation to Trendland on account of the warranty deed. 
Opposition Memorandum: Transcript, pages 7-10. 
3. Whether Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that plaintiffs/appellants be allowed to substitute 
Trendland, as the real party in interest with such substitution 
1 
relating back to the time the lawsuit was originally filed. 
Opposition Memorandum. 
4. Whether defendants/appellees John S. Adams and Taylor, 
Ennenga, Adams & Lowe (Mefendants")are estopped from claiming 
that Maxwell has no damages because, at a point in time after 
Maxwell had conveyed the property to Trendland they represented 
her in an action in which they defended her from a claim that she 
never rightfully owned the property. Transcript, pages 9-10. 
Standard of Review: The appellate court shall correct 
any error made by the trial court in granting a motion for 
summary judgment. Aragon Y, Clover Club Foods Company, 837 
p.2d 250 (Utah ct. App. 1993); Rawlins v, Petersen, 813 p.2d 
1156, 1159 (Utah 1991) . 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 17(a) (1995) : 
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An 
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an 
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party 
authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without 
joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; 
and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state 
of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it 
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest 
until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for 
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
2 
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such 
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same 
effect as if the action hac been commenced in the name of 
the real party in interest. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 (1994): 
Form of Warranty Deed - Effect. 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following 
form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert 
place of residence), hereby conveys and warrants to 
(insert name), grantee, of (insert 
name of residence), for the sum of dollars, the 
following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day of 
, 19 . 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his 
heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together 
with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto 
belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and 
personal representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the 
premises; that he has good right to convey the same; that he 
guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet 
possession thereof; that the premises are free from all 
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal 
representatives will forever warrant and defend the title 
thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all 
lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants 
may be briefly inserted in such deed following the 
description of the land. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was brought by the plaintiffs/appellants for legal 
malpractice. 
Defendants John T. Caine, Randall W. Richards; Richards, 
Caine & Allen have settled with plaintiffs/appellants and are no 
longer parties to the lawsuit. 
The remaining defendants brought a motion for summary 
judgment based on their contention that Maxwell suffered no 
damages. The lower court granted this motion and signed an order 
to that effect on April 20# 1995. 
This appeal seeks reversal of the lower court's granting of 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
FACTS 
1. Appellant Sandra L. Maxwell (^Maxwell") has asserted 
claims against defendants/appellees (^defendants") based on legal 
malpractice. She seeks monetary damages which she has suffered 
as a result of the loss of certain real property designated as 
the Pepperwood Property (the ^property"). Her claims are set 
forth in the Amended Complaint under the Eleventh and Twelfth 
Claims for Relief. (Amended Complaint, paragraphs 117, 261-271 
and Prayer for Relief for the Eleventh and Twelfth Claims, 
Attachment 1.) 
4 
2. On February 27, 1976, Advance Business Equipment 
assigned to Maxwell a Uniform Real Estate Contract it had entered 
into on April 28, 1970 between H.R. Fisher and Frances Fisher 
relating to the purchase of the property. (Deposition of Maxwell 
taken on October 21,1994, pp. 29 and 30 ("Maxwell Deposition"); 
Assignment of Contract, Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 to the Maxwell 
Deposition; Deposition of Richard C. Burke ("Burke") taken on 
October 24 and 25, 1994, p. 60 ("Burke Deposition"), Attachment 
2.) 
3. On May 20, 1983, Frances Fisher conveyed by warranty 
deed to Maxwell the property (Maxwell Deposition, p. 37 and 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 thereto, Attachment 3.) 
4. In 1984, Patricia Wade ("Wade") brought an action 
("first lawsuit") asserting her right to the property, naming 
Burke, Advance Business Equipment and Maxwell as defendants. At 
the time of the first lawsuit title to the property was held in 
Maxwell's name. (Amended Complaint, paragraph 117; Burke 
Deposition, pages 74-75, Attachment 4.) 
5. In September 1987 Maxwell conveyed the property to 
Trendland, Inc. (*Trendland") by warranty deed in exchange for 
90% of Trendland's outstanding stock shares. This transfer was 
accomplished while the first lawsuit was still pending. It was 
5 
made with Trendland's full knowledge, with the understanding that 
Maxwell would continue to defend her ownership to the property. 
(Maxwell Deposition, pp. 46 and 47; Burke Deposition, pp. Ill, 
112 and 117; Maxwell Deposition Defendants' Exhibit No. 3, 
Warranty Deed, Attachment 5.) 
6. In August 1988, defendants began representing Maxwell 
in the first lawsuit. (Burke Deposition, pp. 294-98, Attachment 
6.) 
7. In June 1988, Maxwell's deposition was taken in the 
first lawsuit. During her testimony she indicated that Trendland 
owned the property. (Maxwell Deposition, pp. 135-36 and 150-51, 
Attachment 7.) 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Maxwell has incurred damages as the result of defendants' 
malpractice. She conveyed the property to Trendland in 1987 by 
warranty deed. When the Court found against Maxwell in the first 
lawsuit and awarded the property to Appellant Burke's ex-wife, 
Patricia Wade, Maxwell breached the provisions of the warranty 
deed and became liable to Trendland for the value of the 
property. 
If the Court determines that Trendland is the real party in 
interest, Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
6 
requires that Maxwell be given time to substitute Trendland for 
herself. 
Defendants are estopped from claiming Maxwell has suffered 
no damages. They represented her in the first lawsuit as if she 
did have an interest in the property. They committed malpractice 
by failing to join Trendland to the first lawsuit as the real 
party in interest. Instead, they represented Maxwell, committed 
further malpractice which resulted in the loss of the property, 




BY CONVEYING THE PROPERTY TO TRENDLAND BY WARRANTY 
DEED, MAXWELL OBLIGATED HERSELF TO BRING ANY ACTIONS TO 
RECOVER THE PROPERTY OR MONETARY DAMAGES IN HER OWN 
NAME 
Defendants contend that any claims relating to the loss of 
the property belong to Trendland rather than Maxwell. This 
argument ignores the effect of a conveyance of property by 
warranty deed and the fact that this is an action for legal 
malpractice committed by defendants in a lawsuit to which 
Trendland was not a party. 
A warranty deed requires that: 
7 
the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives will 
forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, 
his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever, 
Utah Code Ann, §57-1-12 (1994). Patricia Wade brought an action 
against Burke, Advance Business Equipment and Maxwell in 1984 
seeking to have the property declared marital property of her 
marriage with Burke, While that action was still pending in 
September of 1987, Maxwell conveyed the property to Trendland by 
warranty deed. The conveyance was made with the full knowledge 
of Trendland, with the understanding that Maxwell would continue 
to defend title to the property in the ongoing lawsuit in her 
name. The goal was to successfully defend title in Maxwell's 
name in order that the property be rightfully held by Trendland. 
Maxwell did not prevail in that prior lawsuit due to 
defendants' malpractice, as well as that of the other named 
defendants in this action.1 The trial court's order nullified 
the transfer of the property to Maxwell in the first place, 
causing her to be in breach of the warranty deed to Trendland. 
Maxwell brought the present action in order to recover damages 
she has suffered in breaching her contract with Trendland. 
1These defendants have settled out of the case. 
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POINT II 
AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANTS' MALPRACTICE, MAXWELL 
BREACHED HER CONTRACT WITH TRENDLAND AND LIABLE TO 
TRENDLAND FOR THE MONETARY VALUE OF THE LOST PROPERTY 
Maxwell brought the complaint in this matter to recover 
monetary damages for the loss she suffered as a result of 
defendants' malpractice. When she unsuccessfully defended her 
right to the property because of appellees' malpractice, she lost 
her interest in the property retroactively. Her transfer of the 
property to Trendland by warranty deed required her to guarantee 
title in her name. When she could not deliver on that promise 
she breached her agreement with Trendland. As a result she owes 
Trendland the value of the property lost. That is the amount she 
seeks in the present case. 
Defendants have indicated that Maxwell has suffered no loss, 
except for the indirect loss she suffers as a shareholder of 
Trendland. Their view is that until Trendland makes a demand of 
some kind, Maxwell has suffered no loss. Defendants cannot cite 
any case law to support this unique view. 
The principle that a plaintiff may recover for an 
anticipated future loss appears to be well established. Damages 
which have not yet occurred, but which are ^reasonably certain" 
to arise, may be recovered by a plaintiff. Walton v. City of 
9 
Bozeman. 588 P.2d 518, 522 (Mont. 1978). See also Sagebrush 
Development. Inc. v. Moehrke. 604 P.2d 198, 203-204 (Wyo. 1979); 
Pierce v. Johns-Manvilie Sales Corp.. 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 
Ct. App. 1983); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.. 628 F.Supp. 1219, 
1230 (D.Mass. 1986)(plaintiff may recover where there is a 
"reasonable probability" that the loss will occur). The only 
limitation on this right is that the damages which are 
"reasonably certain" to occur should not be too speculative. 
Nashland Associates v. Shumate. 730 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Term. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
In the case at hand, Maxwell's loss is certain to occur if 
it has not happened already. She has clearly breached the 
warranty deed with which she conveyed the property to Trendland. 
The amount of the damages is not speculative. The identity of 
the property in question is not in doubt. Maxwell's damages are 
the value of the property lost by Trendland. The loss is# 
therefore, fixed, and can be ascertained accurately by a 
professional appraisal of the property's value. 
POINT III 
IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT TRENDLAND IS THE REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST, MAXWELL SHOULD BE GIVEN A REASONABLE 
TIME TO SUBSTITUTE TRENDLAND 
10 
If the Court determines that Trendland is the real party in 
interest, Rule 17(a) requires that Maxwell have a reasonable time 
to substitute Trendland in her place. Rule 17(a) also states 
that such substitution relates back to the filing date of the 
original complaint for determination of the running of the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING MAXWELL HAS 
SUFFERED NO DAMAGES SINCE SHE DID NOT OWN THE PROPERTY 
AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE BECAUSE THEY 
REPRESENTED HER IN A LAWSUIT AS IF SHE DID OWN THE 
PROPERTY 
Defendants contend that because they did not begin 
representing Maxwell until almost a year after she had conveyed 
the property to Trendland, Appellees could not have done anything 
to create an estoppel issue. Their contention does not reflect a 
correct understanding of the elements necessary to prove an 
estoppel. Estoppel requires proof of three elements: 
1) A statement, admission, act or failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted. 
2) Reasonable action or inaction taken or not taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure 
to act. 
3) Injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act or failure to act. 
11 
CECO Corporation v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 
969-70 (Utah 1989). £££ alSQ Orton v. Utah State Tax Commission. 
Collection Division. 864 P.2d 904, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Each of these elements is present in the case at hand. 
Defendants represented Maxwell, beginning in August 1988, in 
an action where the determination of the rightful ownership of a 
piece of real property was the principal issue. In the course of 
their representation of Maxwell, defendants never sought to join 
Trendland as a party to the litigation. Defendants state that 
they did not know of Trendland's ownership of the property at the 
time they represented Maxwell. Even if they did not have actual 
knowledge, they did have constructive knowledge. 
Defendants stepped into the case at an advanced stage of the 
proceedings. It was their duty to get up to speed on all the 
facts of the case. Defendants began representing Maxwell about a 
month after her deposition was taken in the first lawsuit. 
During that deposition she stated that she had conveyed her 
interest in the property to Trendland. (Maxwell Deposition, pp. 
150-51, Attachment 7.) In a case where the central issue was the 
proper ownership of a piece of property, defendants should have 
checked the history of transfers of that property. At the very 
12 
least they should have reviewed the transcript of their client's 
deposition. 
Defendants should have known about the transfer to 
Trendland. They did not join Trendland to the first lawsuit. 
They represented Maxwell as if she had a stake in the property at 
issue there. Now they have taken an inconsistent position by 
claiming she has no damages as a result of her unsuccessful 
defense of the first lawsuit. Therefore# the first element of 
estoppel is present. 
In bringing the present lawsuit in her name# Maxwell relied 
on the fact that appellees represented her and not Trendland in 
the first suit. This reliance on her part was reasonable because 
she was named in the first lawsuit and she had the attorney-
client relationship with defendants. Therefore, the second 
element of estoppel is satisfied. 
The third element is satisfied also. Maxwell would suffer 
the injury of losing her cause of action for legal malpractice if 
defendants are allowed to contradict their prior actions by 
claiming she has no damages. If this occurs Maxwell will lose 
the equivalent of the value of the property, which is several 
hundred thousand dollars. 
13 
Defendants' position is that Maxwell should have made sure 
that Trendland was a party to the first lawsuit. Their position 
is that as her attorneys they had no responsibility and, 
consequently, no accountability for their actions. The first 
lawsuit named Maxwell as a defendant. Trendland was never joined 
by either side. Even after the deposition testimony indicated 
that Maxwell had conveyed her interest in the property to 
Trendland, the plaintiff, Patricia Wade, did not join Trendland 
as a necessary party. Defendants assert that Maxwell, a non-
lawyer, should have requested that Trendland be joined. She 
hired defendants to represent her. They had the responsibility 
to determine who should be in or out of the lawsuit. 
It is not consistent with principles of justice and fair 
dealing to allow defendants to say that they had no 
responsibility to adequately represent Maxwell in the first 
lawsuit. According to their position they could have committed 
all sorts of blatant malpractice with complete impunity. There 
are two levels of malpractice present in this case: the instances 
complained of by Maxwell are on one level; the second level is 
comprised of the instances acknowledged by defendants which they 
claim insulate them from any liability, namely, the failure to 
involve Trendland in any way. Defendants have taken the position 
14 
that because they did not properly interview their client or 
properly review the case file, most notably Maxwell's deposition 
transcript, they cannot be held liable for any resulting 
malpractice. 
CONCLUSION 
Maxwell has suffered a loss due to the alleged malpractice 
of defendants. Because she is in breach of her agreement with 
Trendland, she owes Trendland the equivalent of the monetary 
value of the property. 
Even if Maxwell's damages will not occur until Trendland 
makes a formal demand, Maxwell may recover because the loss is 
"reasonably certain" to occur and the value of the loss is simple 
to calculate. 
"If) 
DATED this ^>~ day of October, 1995. 
WHATCOTT, BARRETT & HAGEN 
Jeffrey fE. flagen 
Kevin D. Whatcott 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. MAXWELL, 
RICHARD C. BURKE, 




Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
JOHN T. CAINE, RANDALL W. 
RICHARDS, RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Defendants. Case No. 920901881 
* * # * * 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Monday, March 25, 
1995, at 9:00 a.m. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendants: 
JEFFREY H. HAGEN, ESQ. 
KEVIN WHATC0TT, ESQ. 
WHATCOTT, BARRETT & HAGEN 
10 West Broadway #450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CARMAN KIPP 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 400 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 MONDAY, MARCH 27, J995 9:00 A.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Let's go to the No. 1 case on the 
4 calendar, case No. 920901881. Counsel, would you 
5 identify yourselves for the record, please. 
6 VOICE: I am Carman Kipp, Your Honor. I 
7 represent the Adams and the law firm in connection with 
8 that portion of the claim in the suit that is made by 
9 Sandra Maxwell. 
10 VOICE: Kevin Whatcott and Jeff Hagen 
11 representing Sandra Maxwell. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Mr. Kipp, are 
13 you prepared to go forward, sir? 
14 MR. KIPP: Yes, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: You may do so. Mr. Kipp, before 
16 you begin let me say to you and Mr. Whatcott and Mr. 
17 Hagen that in preparation or in preparing for this matter 
18 over the weekend. I was about halfway through my 
19 preparation in reading the memoranda that is on file in 
20 this matter and then I looked at the last order signed by 
21 the Court, which was an Order of Dismissal and I did not 
22 look at that order close enough because when I saw that 
23 order. I assumed that all of the issues in this case had 
24 been resolved. So I did not — 
25 MR. KIPP: Your Honor. I can similarly report 
1 that I went skiing at Park City In the spring sunshine, 
2 and It was wonderful, and I didn't even have a eecond 
3 thought aboul t'.iie mil 11 n h o u \ H .'< this morning when I 
4 remembered I was supposed to be here at 9. The issues 
5 are very similar. 
6 THE COURT: '\JUI until is what I was going to 
7 say, T did want you to know that I did get far enough 
8 through the materials to discover that 
9 I lotion for Summary Judgment is whether or not I 
10 believe Ms. Maxwell actually owns the property that is 
11 the alleged subject, I believe,, "I tk r damhge claim. 
12 MR K1PP I think I can vocalize. Your Honor, 
13 and counsel can and the briefs are not long. If the 
14 Court wants to take a minute i - 1B 
15 very simple. 
16 Having completed some discovery, including the 
17 depositions of the on hei' p I M n l I 1" i hi chard Burke, who is 
in "other of Sandra Maxwell, and having completed 
19 Sandra Maxwell's deposition, it became evident that Ms. 
20 Maxwell did not o- operty In question at any t^™** 
i rl to + > H « awsuit. And, in fact, transferred 
221 "«ah corporation in September of 1987. 
23 Very briefly, 7 our Honor
 r Mie claims originally 
\\\ asserted were principally related to a history of about 
2fi oi-x years of representation by Allen. Caine & Rich ••• f 
1 Ogden for Mr. Burke for having to do with his company, 
2 Advance Business Equipment, and Sandra Maxwell. I do not 
3 represent those folks. They settled. They are out of 
4 the lawsuit. 
5 The only single claim remaining is a claim by 
6 Ms. Maxwell that Mr. Adams didn't do a good job in 
7 looking out for her. I had one hearing in this court 
8 where a Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in favor 
9 of a divorce plaintiff, now the ex-wife of Mr. Burke, 
10 with respect to a specific piece of property known as 
11 Pepperwood. As a result, half of the Pepperwood property 
12 was distributed out of that court proceeding to the ex-
13 wife. Exactly how that was achieved is beyond me, Your 
14 Honor, because at that point in time the property was on 
15 the records by a Utah corporation known as Trenlin and 
16 had been for some time. 
17 But in either-or any case. Your Honor, the 
18 claim before the Court here is a claim by Ms. Maxwell 
19 that we were professionally negligent and loss resulted 
20 to her. 
21 Interestingly enough, the case which I was 
22 involved is the latest leading authority on the elements 
23 of a lawyer malpractice claim is cited and I am sure you 
24 are aware of those elements. In fact, we have argued 
25 them before this Court. This case is one of no harm-no 
3 
1 foul If aht didn't own the property, she can't claim 
° the loss, IT I S clear she did not own 'the property 
having transferred iu m September "•*" , CJU*' - lelvuni lor 
4 stock I i'i Mi In company and sh. - « ..- stock. 
* Counsel asserts - response that "oh 
o well, the company has some may have 
7 some claim because she warranted the title of the 
8 property when she passed to the company." Well that Is 
9 interesting but i opened in \M\\\ 
10 This is now 1995 :he Statute of Limitations has long 
11 since on these such claim and the record is to the 
12 effect that - - - She just made a 
13 claim for some property she didn't own. 
14 And chain of events, Your Honor, 
15 Mr Buik'- hi" financial problems and there is some 
16 dispute about exact details that really doesn't have 
17 any meaning to the Issues we are addressing today; b it 
1 8 ajiii'iirifj' o t iii'i' i • open (::;,:! es, I: le acquired this property and his 
19 company: Advance Business Equipment. Then for reasons 
20 that are dispute and for consideration 
21 d ransferred it to hi s sister And 
22 subsequently as I have said in 1987, she transferred 1t 
23 "to a new corporation that was formed and she go t :;. sto< \k 
24 :. we d 't represent anybody except Sandra 
25 Maxwell represent the corporation. The 
4 
1 corporation had no claim against us. We had no 
2 professional obligation to the corporation. They cited 
3 the case of Norman against Murray First Thrift and in our 
4 reply brief when you get a chance to look at that, Your 
5 Honor, that case says, and I quote, "Even though a 
6 shareholder owns all or practically all of the stock in 
7 the corporation, such a fact does not authorize him to 
8 sue as an individual for a wrong done by a third party to 
9 a corporation." They would like to say, "Well, she owned 
10 most of the stock, therefore she gets a loss." That may 
11 be true, but that doesn't give her a right to sue in 
12 place of the corporation. 
13 They suggest a corporation can be substituted. 
14 They can't do that. One, it is not timely. Two, it is 
15 barred by the statute and, three, the corporation has no 
16 claim against us anyway. We didn't represent the 
17 corporation. That is the simple nuts and bolts of it, 
18 Your Honor. 
19 She didn't own the property. The claim is she 
20 lost half of the property and as a result suffered 
21 damages. She couldn't have suffered damages. She had no 
22 ownership. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Whatcott. 
24 MR. WHATCOTT: For the Court's benefit, I want 
25 to go through a brief chronology because I think counsel 
5 
1 h H •' 1H • nn I i' r J t t en 1 ia< • 1.8, or it. 11' n I elements that make 
2 this a viable claim still• 
3 It was back in February of 1978 that Advance 
4 nt w company owned by Dick 
5 Burke, assigned a land sale contract to Sandra Maxwell. 
In May of 1983, Maxwell received a warranty deed 
7 con trac 1:,:! i ig i e r t;j w hi :il:i was a party by the name of 
Q
 Fisher. '83 Maxwell is now record owner of the 
property October -^ j. 1985 Wade, who is Pick Burke's 
formei wile, she brought an action seeking a claim on the 
Pepperwood property. This property that Advance Business 
Equipment had sold or assigned to Maxwe] J ^ 
that action was filed, Sandra Maxwell was still the 
record owner. August : 1987 Sandra Maxwell warranty 
x^ deeded the propert; 988, •: 
16 inter, was when Ad* represented Maxwell. 
17 Now, keep in mind that at this point Adams is 
x o a h v 1 K »M ' H r v 11" i 11 'i i iii i""i* i "1 o \i 1 , i  \In- " 111 iiV I u \M n t h e 
19 property BH Hhe- duesn t have a claim," But it was after 
20 she transferred that property to Trenlin that Adams 
21 represent e 1 \v\ t , r 
22 tiled prior1 10 her transferring the property to Trenlin. 
23 It was in September of .*• month after Adams began his 
24 representation c • • I Ui<J - Lered an 
25 order granting Wade essentially Maxwel interest in the 
6 
1 property. 
2 There are really two arguments that arise out 
3 of this. The first one I think is very simple. It is 
4 the warranty deed argument. To the extent that Trenlin 
5 may have a claim against Maxwell under the warranty deed, 
6 Utah Code Annotated 57-1-12 is very clear. Says, "The 
7 grantor, heirs, personal representatives, will forever 
8 warrant and defend title thereof, the grantees, his 
9 heir8, and assigns against all unlawful claims 
10 whatsoever." So Maxwell in warranty deeding the property 
11 to Trenlin has an obligation to defend Trenlin's interest 
12 in the property. 
13 Now, any claim that Trenlin may have on the 
14 property necessarily falls on the shoulders of Maxwell. 
15 She is required to warrant and defend the title. It may 
16 be that when all is said and done, if Maxwell recovers 
17 that that recovery belongs, because of the warranty deed, 
18 to Trenlin, but that is not the point here. The point is 
19 simply that she warranty deeded it to Trenlin. Trenlin 
20 is out because of her actions. She is required to secure 
21 that claim, the claim that Trenlin may have, but really 
22 what we are talking about here is not title to the 
23 property. This isn't an action to quiet title. What we 
24 are talking about is the damage suffered by Maxwell 
25 because of Adams. 
7 
1 This is a legal malpractice claim. Maxwell, in 
° establishing her claim, has to establish the elements 
that Mr. Kipp has thoughtfully put, i rth hi the 
4 memorandum and he is correct. The element we are talking 
5 about today Is damage: has she suffered damage? The 
6 measure of the damage *w* r In UIH question is 
7 "Yes," but the measure of • damage Is the value of the 
8 Pepperwood proper t; is not the ownership of the 
9 Pepperwood \ t reason that we 
10 continually talk about the Pepperwood property and who 
11 should have owned the Pepperwood
 pr0perty. 
12 Again, Junk back at the chronology. Maxwell 
13 transferred to Trenlin in 87, Adams representing 
14 Maxwell in *88, and then a month I ater Wade tfouJd give 
15 h property. 
16 Two significant points arise out of this 
17 chronology. First. jUifi HI1 t Ion in 
18 awarding the property .*.,>- undid all of the 
19 transactions from 197f *••• 1987. This was the underlying 
20 basis of our malpract In I in "1*1 II in I imp ?f WMM « 
21 legitimate Statute ol limitations defense that was not 
22 set forth. That is the basis of the claim, Because 
23 Maxwell " H c.ouhfiel ciiJ d 1 10 t assert, thuM-p o'l&l.uifa, I he L'uurt 
24 went back a period of eight years and undid nil of the 
25 transactions in-between. Therefore, 1£ we are able to 
8 
1 try to set things straight, set things the way they 
2 should be, title to the property still has to pass 
3 through Maxwell before it gets to Trenlin. She has an 
4 interest because the transfer — we are not just talking 
5 about the transfer from her, but the transfer to her has 
6 been undone. But more importantly, Adams represented 
7 Maxwell after her transfer and I can't emphasize this 
8 point enough• I keep going back to it. But for Adams at 
9 this point to come in and claim that Maxwell has no 
10 interest in the property, would be essentially to have 
11 allowed Adams to do whatever he wanted. It would have 
12 given Adams no responsibility to act with proper regard 
13 to his client's interest because he can sit back and say, 
14 "Well, I may be representing Maxwell in this action that 
15 deal solely with the Pepperwood property, but you know 
16 what, if I mess up it doesn't matter because really, 
17 wink-wink, Maxwell doesn't own that property. Trenlin 
18 does." And yet Adams represented to the Court that he 
19 represented Maxwell with respect to this very property 
20 that we are talking about today. 
21 In essence, Maxwell would then be without any 
22 recourse, without any cause of action against Adams for 
23 his misdeeds, and this is something that the Court 
24 shouldn't allow. The Court shouldn't allow Adams to act 
25 negligently in all other respects toward his client, 
9 
1 Sandra Maxwell, and then in the end come back and say, 
2 "Well, I am sorry, she can't sue me because I really 
3 nit fcirepreaented to the Court her ownershIp 1 ntereat, or 
4 she really had no claim in the underlying matter." 
5 reality, she had a claim She had a claim 
6 on the pi 3cause all o:l: the PI lor transactions 
7 were undone. We are looking here, Your Honor, not t o 
8 recover the actual property but just ut of a measure of 
9 damages, how was she damaged? And i'". 1 n fact, that 
10 damage relates to this claim by Trenlin against her, 
11 which could come In the future, then raofoelfc. But that 
12 not an issue for this Court to worry about It is not 
13 issue for these parties to worry about. That is 
14 somethl iig: tha t ma $ come J ;E „ ter Tr 
15 percent of whatever recovery Maxwell gets here against 
16 her, but that is not the issue. The issue is simply was 
18 this Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, everybody 
19 agreed way back to 1 ho time that Adams was representing 
20 her, everybody agreed Uie! ulir lii'ni an Inter* : it 
21 property arid because of that action by Wade sht 
22 required to defend. 
23 For that ro&son, Youi Honor „ wo <* mid eek I he 
24 Court to deny tl le Motion for Summary Judgment. Let this 
25 case go forward. 
1 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Whatcott. Mr. Kipp. 
2 MR. KIPP: I can be brief, Your Honor. This, I 
3 guess, really doesn't matter to the lawsuit but there 
4 isn't any record before you, nor is it a fact that we 
5 made any representations about title to the property or 
6 agreed to her having an interest. The record is clear 
7 she had no interest. As far as representing her, the 
8 transcript of the proceedings said that Adams, who is now 
9 deceased and not available, Adams said, "Well, Judge, I 
10 don't really represent her but thinking about 
11 representing her." That doesn't really matter to this. 
12 She sold the property to a corporation and got 
13 corporate stock for the property. And she did that 
14 before any of the events that relate to any clients 
15 occurred, including the order by the Court in 1988 with 
16 respect to the property. She had no interest in the 
17 property then. She sold it of record and she has been 
18 paid in stock. She still owns the stock. Trenlin is not 
19 in this lawsuit. Maybe somebody screwed up and they 
20 should have put them in, but they are not in. They are 
21 barred by the statute to make a claim against her since 
22 their damage occurred as a result of the order of 1988. 
23 They can't make that claim now. She has no damage and we 
24 should be out of this lawsuit. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kipp. Counsel, what 
11 
1 1 . i >« *hie to get this 
2 done by the end * T I t *•• -e need to read Mr, 
3 Whatcott's motion and Memorandum in Opposition, ao well 
4 o. 
5 MR, KIPP: What was that, Your Honor? 
6 THE COURT: I am just tell ing 
7 \\< Menu/ in Opposition, ae wel 1 as the Reply Memo 
Q
 and I would expect to have a ruling on this matter for 
y O U by the end of the week. 
11 MR. WHATCOTT: Your Honor, in the Reply 
I I Memorandum, we did not include the argument which we 
12 believe ax, x,i ' luuklu^ Iniu I he matter 
II further, *« 4 strongest argument and that being this 
.14 argument that Adams represented Maxwell after the 
15 transfer occurred; an-l w- are Jutst looking at the undoing 
16 of a] 1 of the prior transfers. 
17 If the Court would allow or would deem 
18 appro pi Ifilr w* wnvilil .like to submit a supplemental 
19 memorandum tu that effect if the Court would find that 
20 helpful. I don't think * Memorandum in Oppositic \o 
21 t adgment adequately covers what we 
22 believe at this point * strongest argument. 
23 THE COURT: Let m^ o< y^, Mr. Whatcott ; 
24 i However, your oral argument has clearly 
25 expressed that point. 
12 
1 MR. WHATCOTT: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 
2 MR. KIPP: Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
SANDRA L. MAXWELL; 
RICHARD C. BURKE; and 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN T. CAINE, 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS, 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS, a 
Utah professional partnership; 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, a Utah 
professional partnership; the 
ESTATE OP JOHN S. ADAMS, by and 
through KENT M. KASTING, Personal 
Representative; and 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS 6 LOWE, 
a Utah professional corporation, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED) 
Civil No. 920901881 CN 
Judge 
Plaintiffs complain of defendants, and, demanding trial by 
jury, seek relief as follows: 
114. On November 28, 1990 the Court conducted a hearing on 
Burke's Motion for Relief. Neither Caine nor RC&A appeared at that 
hearing to rebut Burke's Affidavit. 
115. On December 4, 1990 the Court entered its Minute Entry 
vacating and setting aside the June 23, 1989 Order because it Nwas 
entered without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff [Burke] and 
contrary to plaintiff's instructions to his attorney [Caine and 
RC&A].M 
116. That Minute Entry was reduced to an Order entered on 
December 27, 1990. 
THE PEPPERWOOD ACTION INVOLVING CAINE. RICHARDS AND RC&A 
117. On October 8# 1985, Wade filed an action in Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, designated as Civil No. 
C85-6773, against Burke, ABE, Maxwell and others, claiming that 
Burke and Maxwell committed fraud by obtaining declarations in the 
Decree that (1) the Pepperwood Property was not part of the marital 
estate; and (2) ABE was not Burke's alter ego. 
118. In her Complaint Wade sought to set aside a transfer of 
the Pepperwood Property from ABE to Maxwell as a fraudulent 
conveyance, and to obtain an order declaring that Maxwell held 
one-half of the Pepperwood Property in constructive trust for the 
benefit of Wade. 
21 
1988) conclusively established that motions for 
reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) Entered into a Stipulation agreeing to prejudicially 
shorten the time for the August 15# 1988 hearing on 
Wade'8 Motion for Entry of Judgment; and 
(f) Failed to ensure that Maxwell's new counsel timely filed 
a Notice of Appeal of the Court's September 7, 1988 Order 
and Judgment. 
259. As a direct and proximate result of Richards' and RC&A's 
negligence, Maxwell incurred substantial damage, including, but not 
limited to, her loss of one-half of the Pepperwood Property, having 
a value of approximately $600,000. 
260. Maxwell is entitled to recover from Richards and RC&A all 
damages sustained by Maxwell as a direct and proximate result of 
Richards' and RC&A's negligence, including, but not limited to, the 
damages set forth in paragraph 259 above. 
XIV 
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(AGAINST ADAMS AND TEA&L) 
(Breach of Contract/Pepperwood Action) 
For the Eleventh Claim for Relief, Maxwell complains against 
defendants Adams' Estate and TEA&L, and alleges as follows: 
55 
261. Maxwell realleges and incorporates herein by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 260 set forth hereinabove. 
262. Maxwell entered into a valid contract whereby Adams and 
TEA&L agreed to provide legal services to Maxwell in exchange for 
a fee. 
263. Maxwell's contract with Adams and TEA&L, which included 
an implied covenant of competence, diligence and due care, required 
Adams and TEA&L: 
(a) To be adequately prepared, upon accepting representation 
of Maxwell, to defend Maxwell against all motions brought 
against her; 
(b) To zealously defend Maxwell's interests in all hearings 
where relief was sought against Maxwell; 
(c) To timely file notices of appeal of all final orders 
adversely affecting Maxwell's interests; 
(d) To request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 1988 
Order on the grounds that the previously decided opinion 
oS the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988) 
conclusively established that motions for reconsideration 
were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) To file reply memoranda supporting motions brought by 
Adams and TEA&L on Maxwell's behalf; and 
56 
(f) To give Maxwell proper legal advise regarding her failure 
to appeal final orders. 
264. In breach of their contract with Maxwell in the implied 
covenant of competence, diligence and due care, Adams and TEA&L 
inexcusably: 
(a) Failed to request a continuance of the August 15, 1988 
hearing on Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment; 
(b) Failed to make any argument whatsoever on Maxwell's 
behalf at the August 15, 1988 hearing on Wade's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment; 
(c) Failed to file timely notices of appeal of (1) the 
Court's September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; (2) the 
Court's October 21, 1988 Order; and (3) the Court's 
February 17, 1989 Order; 
(d) Failed to request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 
1988 Order on the grounds that the previously decided 
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. 
v.* James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 
1988) conclusively established that motions for 
reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) Failed to file any reply memorandum with respect to 
Maxwell's December 28, 1988 Motion for Relief from the 
September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; and 
57 
(f) Incorrectly advised Maxwell through Burke that Burke's 
appeal of the Court's December 2, 1988 Order would 
adequately protect Maxwell from the effects of the 
Court's September 7, 1988 and October 21, 1988 Orders. 
265. As a direct consequence of Adams' and TEA&L's breaches of 
contract, Maxwell lost one-half of the Pepperwood Property. 
266. By reason of Adams' and TEA&L's breaches of contract, 
Maxwell has suffered damages resulting from those defendants' 
breach in an amount in excess of $600,000, plus prejudgment 
interest as provided by law, the precise amount of which will be 
established by proof at trial. 
XV 
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(AGAINST ADAMS AND TEA&L) 
(Negligence/Pepperwood Action) 
For the Twelfth Claim for Relief, Maxwell complains against 
defendants Adams' Estate and TEA&L, and alleges as follows: 
267. Maxwell realleges and incorporates herein by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 266 set forth hereinabove. 
268. As Maxwell'8 attorneys, Adams and TEA&L owed Maxwell a 
duty to represent Maxwell's interest with competence, diligence and 
due care and to possess the legal skills and knowledge common to 
58 
members of their profession, which included among other things, the 
duties 
(a) To be adequately prepared, upon accepting representation 
of Maxwell, to defend Maxwell against all motions brought 
against her; 
(b) To zealously defend Maxwell's interests in all hearings 
where relief was sought against Maxwell; 
(c) To timely file notices of appeal of all final orders 
adversely affecting Maxwell's interests; 
(d) To request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 1988 
Order on the grounds that the previously decided opinion 
of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake Citv Corp, v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988) 
conclusively established that motions for reconsideration 
were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) To file reply memoranda supporting motions brought by 
Adams and TEA&L on Maxwell's behalf; and 
(f) TQ give Maxwell proper legal advise regarding her failure 
to appeal final orders. 
269. In breach of the duties set forth above, Adams and TEA&L, 
among other things, negligently 
(a) Failed to request a continuance of the August 15, 1988 
hearing on Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment; 
59 
(b) Failed to make any argument whatsoever on Maxwell's 
behalf at the August 15, 1988 hearing on Wade's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment; 
(c) Failed to file timely notices of appeal of (1) the 
Court's September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; (2) the 
Court's October 21, 1988 Order; and (3) the Court's 
February 17, 1989 Order; 
(d) Failed to request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 
1988 Order on the grounds that the previously decided 
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. 
v, James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 
1988) conclusively established that motions for 
reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) Failed to file any reply memorandum with respect to 
Maxwell's December 28, 1988 Motion for Relief from the 
September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; and 
(f) Incorrectly advised Maxwell through Burke that Burke's 
appeal of the Court's December 2, 1988 Order would 
adequately protect Maxwell from the effects of the 
Court'8 September 7, 1988 and October 21, 1988 Orders. 
270. As a direct and proximate result of Adams' and TEA&L's 
negligence, Maxwell incurred substantial damage, including, but not 
60 
limited to, her loss of one-half of the Pepperwood Property, having 
a value of approximately $600,000. 
271. Maxwell is entitled to recover from Adams and TEA&L all 
damages sustained by Maxwell as a direct and proximate result of 
Adams' and TEA&L's negligence, including, but not limited to, the 
damages set forth in paragraph 270 above. 
XVI 
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(AGAINST CAINE, RC&R AND RC&A) 
(Breach of Contract/Child Support Judgments) 
For the Thirteenth Claim for Relief Burke complains against 
defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A, and alleges as follows: 
272. Burke realleges and incorporates herein by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 271 as set forth hereinabove. 
273. Burke entered into a valid contract whereby Caine, RC&R 
and RC&A agreed to provide legal services to Burke in exchange for 
a fee. 
274. Burke'8 contract with Caine, RC&R and RC&A, which 
included an implied covenant of competence, diligence and due care, 
required Caine, RC&R and RC&A, among other things,: 
(a) To prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
supporting the Decree in accordance with the court's 
January 5, 1984 Order in the Divorce Action, stating that 
61 
3. That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of 
suit* 
4. That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the 
Court deems appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, under the Eleventh Claim for Relief, Maxwell prays 
for judgment against Defendants Adams and TEA&L as follows: 
1. That those defendants be adjudicated as having breached 
their contract with Maxwell and are, therefore, liable to Maxwell. 
2. That Maxwell have and recover from those defendants 
judgment for all damages sustained by Maxwell at least in the 
amount of $600,000, plus prejudgment interest. 
3. For an award of incidental and consequential damages 
suffered by Maxwell, including an award of Maxwell's reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred in this matter. 
4. That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of 
suit. 
5. That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the 
Court deems-appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, under the Twelfth Claim for Relief, Maxwell prays 
for judgment against Defendants Adams and TEA&L as follows: 
1. That defendants Adams and TEA&L be adjudicated as having 
negligently represented Maxwell. 
71 
2. That Maxwell have and recover from those defendants 
judgment for all damages sustained by Maxwell at least in the 
amount of $600,000, plus prejudgment interest. 
3. That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of 
suit. 
4. That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the 
Court deems appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, under the Thirteenth Claim for Relief, Burke prays 
for judgment against Defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A as follows: 
1. That those defendants be adjudicated as having breached 
their contract with Burke and are, therefore, liable to Burke. 
2. That Burke have and recover from those defendants 
judgment for all damages sustained by Burke at least in the amount 
of $48/000, plus prejudgment interest. 
3. For an award of incidental and consequential damages 
suffered by Burke, including an award of Burke's reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred in this matter* 
4. That Burke recover from those defendants his costs of 
suit. 
5. That Burke have such other and further relief as the 
Court deems appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, under the Fourteenth Claim for Relief, Burke prays 




Q What was the next piece of property --
okay# we've now talked about your home that you 
still live in. What was the next piece of real 
property that you've either purchased or received? 
A That would be the large piece, 
Pepperwood property. 
MR. KAY: Would you mark that. 
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1 was marked for 
identification.) 
Q (BY MR. KAY) I'm going to hand you, 
Mrs. Maxwell, Defendant's Exhibit 1 which is 
entitled an Assignment of Contract that was given 
to me by your attorney this morning. Is that your 
understanding, an Assignment of Contract relating 
to what you've described as the Pepperwood 
property? 
A Yes. 
Q What was the date that you received an 
interest in the Pepperwood property? 
MR. HAGEN: You can look at what it 
says on there if you want. 
THE WITNESS: 1970. 
24 Q (BY MR. KAY) Well, I believe does it 
25 say that you received it February --
Transcribe America 
(800) 8330288 / (202) 842-4602 






A I'm sorry. I'm looking down here. 
Q I think that's the original Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. Is it your understanding it 
^ was approximately February 27th, 1976? 
% A Yeah. 
MR. KIPP: What are we looking at now? 
MR. KAY: We're looking at the 
pepperwood Assignment of Contract that's been 
marked as Exhibit 1 in the documents they gave us 
today. It's that document that you have in your 
hand. 
•2 MR. KIPP: Thank you. 
JJ Q (BY MR. KAY) How was it that you 
££ received this Pepperwood property that's been 
j5 described in Exhibit 1 in February of 1976? 
X<T A I'm sorry, what do you mean? 
17 Q Well, prior to February 27th, 1976, I 
It understand that you didn't have the Pepperwood 
19 property; is that correct? 
20 A Yes, uh-huh. 
21 Q Who owned the Pepperwood property 
22 before February 27, 1976? 
23 A Advance Business Equipment. 
24 Q And Advance Business Equipment is a 
25 company that your brother, Richard Burke owns; is 
Ti t**"»t%t/%•••»*** * 
irtu Ai.attMtm, modt m tht City of ^Odtn * 5«ott ©' Uion on tKe »^.- llXJl doy of 
—.^s/r.iutitf ...., 1°.IA- by ond between .^4/fuanc^. JaA^^_£axLa«j&£^A^^ 
_*.<. aCaA _ _ i 
h j r e » * f t - r r t f t r r td to oi tht assignors, ond . ^ M A A . 1—?\mi»* f f a f Y ^ n , ^ 
Kcreiaofttr t*l*tf4 !c ot tKo assignees, 
WITNESSETH* 
v/:t£«!£A$, yndor dot. of -Jfliu/L-to' , . i? JHL, J£.JLJFiAhtAjutcljActflm.FiAAuuJuj tc£,<c 
ot sellers, «i\f*r«o* into o Uniform Jttal C»«o*e Contract with 
^WWttJ&A^flC4A.fj?JI^^ 
ot b c y t r i , of&L&t Ultt CUjioh, which contract It dtflvered herewith, wherein ana* whereby tht tola* tetters 
ogeeed to tell ana* tht laid bvyert ogrted to purchase, upon tht terms, conditions, ana* provisions therein t i t 
forth, all that certain fond, with tht buildings and Improvement! thereon, erected, situate, lying ana* being la 
tho County of .-$£?£.. k*A* ...*. . _ ~ * Slote of Utoh, and mora porttculorly described 4% M o w n 
T.'ie 5oaT>. 3°$ ft'A of tht UoAjO\zcuJt owoKtt\ of tiit UoAtxmt qiwUtA of tht UoAthvut 
owxtM cl Stttion IU tht Soutii 596 'fttt of Xf:e E(Ut ont-hsZf of tht Noxthmt quAKtti 
of tiit Xo-'fvxjut qwAJtcA of tlit UoHXhuaAt oucKtlK ol Stttion IV tiit 'IOAJUX U4 ftfX of 
tiit ?ant!\u*4t qvumttA of tht UoKthvtAJt quaKtzn. ol tht VoKtheMt oaoAtVi of Stttion tl: 
end tht Haith 164 fttt of tixt Fcut ont-hxUf of tht ToativxAt quflktzK of ti\t UotXSvxAt 
qucAXtX of tiit UoKtlxtoAt QWOAXVL of Section 11. T<v*o/i£» 3 South. Tangt f East, SLUM. 
SUBJECT to t/uemestft, KtitAictiorA end KlolxtA of v#u avtHiuUnQ of KtcoKd, OK tnfoiccAbtt 
in Oil** ox totUtu. 
to wh«ch agreement In writing, reference It htroby mode for ad of tho terms, conditions ana* provisions 
thereof, end 
V/HcilSAS, tht assignees desire to acquire from tho assignor* all of tho right, tlllo and interest of ' tht 
ctvlpnors In and to tht to id written agreement, 
NOW. THEXEfOtf, It It hereby mutually a g r t t d at follows* 
1 . That tht atslgnort In consideration of tho Payment of Ten Dollars and other good and voluobte 
consideration, tht rtctlpt of which it hereby acknowledged, assign to tho ostigneet, alt their right, title and 
••»»?'•.» t« cr.i • - *hs cfdrttcid Uniform Seal cttoft Contract of -*&T.M£JLJ • —„ 1°_2£..« concerning tht 
*b~ve dsic-ibed property, 
2 . That to Induct the assignees to pay tho to id turn of money ond to accept tht toid contract, tht at* 
ftignoo hereby reprttont to tho ott«gne«« a t fodowti 
c. TKot 'ha attignAr* h^v« duly performtd all tho conditions of tho told contract. 
b. Tnof tho contract it now In full forct and offe<f ond thot the unpaid botonco of toid contract It 
' $ I 5 < J H L 4 < L with'lnt.rett paid to tho JLlth day of JExhumif IfZi— 
3. Tnit MI contidtrotion of the attignort executing and delivering fhit agrterr.tnf, tht ottigneet cava* 
A O M w«th t1»e attignori ot foltowti 
a . That tho attigneet wQ duly Vtep, ob»«r%t and perform all of tho terms, conditions ond provlsiont 
• ' •*»• solid ogre«m««»t tKot or* to b« V*pt, ob««rv«d a i d p«'fo'«n«d by the o»»ignors«* 
b. Tt*«* tho cttigneet will io«t and bold hormUit tKo o»%lgnort of and from any •««* oil ocilont, tuttt, 
coiit, domoget, claims and demands wholtoev* ' oriiing by reason of an act or omittion of tho 
ait«gne#t. 
IN WtTNCSS WtUKEOf,* The parties hereto hov* hereunto set their hands and teolt the day ond year 
first ab^vf wriitcn, 
, AJi+«< ^- A / i c*S A*t, %,St. t, T 
ViotAVL/ pubUc) » J / c / / p ; 4 . .-/*. 
KaicUn at Ctftn, Utah.
 # XJ -V^/ ^ 7 / ' / HP/('<•• ' 
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the '70's, or not? 
A I believe it was in the '80's. 
£l Q So you bought the Pepperwood property 
from the Fishers and paid payments for a few years; 
is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And then in 1976, February 27, 1976, 
i y°u assigned the contract with the Fishers to 
% Sandra Maxwell; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, why did you assign the contract 
2 between Advance Business Equipment and the Fishers 
j to Sandra Maxwell? 
4 A Well, for two reasons, basically. The 
5 company was in a little bit of a financial problem 
6 at that period of time and I didn't feel that the 
7 company would have the money to make the next 
i 
I payment to the Fishers, and we didn't want to lose 
e 
I the property entirely, so --
0 Q Did you have a concern that if the 
1 company still had the property, that creditors 
2 could reach it? 
J A Well, it wouldn't be creditors. It 
4 would just be that if we couldn't make the 
5 payments, that Bud Fisher would probably take the 
Transcribe America 
ATTACHMENT 3 
Oct 3/, /«W 
37 
A To Mrs. Fisher? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q How many years did you make payments? 
A 0h# what, 10 years possibly. I can't 
remember exactly. 
Q After you made payments and paid off 
the contract, did you receive a Warranty Deed from 
the Fishers? 
A Yes, 
Q And you didn't produce any Warranty 
Deed today; is that correct? 
A Apparently not. 
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 2 was marked for 
identification.) 
Q (BY MR. KAY) I'm going to hand you 
what's been marked as Exhibit 2 to your deposition, 
Mrs. Maxwell, and this is entitled Warranty Deed 
from Frances Fisher to Sandra Maxwell dated May 20, 
1983. Is Exhibit 2 the Warranty Deed that you 
received from Frances Fisher after you had paid the 
contract on Pepperwood? 
A It looks to be that. 
Q Does this refresh your memory that you 
TrnnScrihe America 
•Ma 14 i*a nvuvt \w 
i 4404466 
" WARRANTY DEED s^ 
u 
Frances Fisher , Wife of H. R. Fisher (deceased) 
lake City 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
r ranees rimer, «uc at «• iv. (imcr vocccaiea/ srinfOf 
of Salt Lake City County of Salt Lake
 $tM o f U t a h f flcrcbv 
Sandra I . Maxwell, a woman 
, County of Weber, S tate ot _ _ 
Ten dollars and other good and valuable consideration DOLLARS 
grantee 
of Ogden Utah for &c SVLtn 0( 
the foHowing described tract of land in County, 
State of Utahs 
The South 396 feet of the Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Sect ion 22; the South 396 feet of the Cast one-hal f of 
the Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter ot the Northeast quarter of 
Section 22; the North 264 feec o f the Southeast quarter of the Norchwese . 
q*iarctr of the Northeast quarter of Sect ion 22; and the .North 264 f ee t of 
th* Cast on«-half of the Southv*»e quarter of th« Northveit quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Sect ion 2 2 , Township 3 South, Range 1 Z*9t9 SLB6M 
SUBJECT to easements, r e s t r i c t i o n s and rights of way appearing of record, or 
«ntorceaole in law or equi ty . 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor, this 20 th dav
 0f 
MJV A.D. 1983^ 
Signed in the Pretence of -^^si /* •• <** s * ^"r^t/^cAy^ 
STATE OF UTAH. t 
Countv of . J . L 1 
On che ^ 0 ^ davof \Y\Qjft '' .A.D. I ? J ? 4 
personally appeared before me U 
thc.-iiy.-i.* of the within inttrument. who ctuly aclnoulcdjcd to mc ihaiihc executed the 
V " < ^ 
* A!y cnmmr.^mi t.xpifci *> m *\ * h x 1- Reading in » } I f .
 t / M'/j J ' 
• -
:Vi' v A 






114. On November 28, 1990 the Court conducted a hearing on 
Burke's Motion for Relief. Neither Caine nor RC&A appeared at that 
hearing to rebut Burke's Affidavit. 
115. On December 4, 1990 the Court entered its Minute Entry 
vacating and setting aside the June 23, 1989 Order because it Hwas 
entered without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff [Burke] and 
contrary to plaintiff's instructions to his attorney [Caine and 
RC&A].H 
116. That Minute Entry was reduced to an Order entered on 
December 27, 1990. 
THE PEPPERWOOD ACTION INVOLVING CAINE, RICHARDS AND RC&A 
117. On October 8, 1985, Wade filed an action in Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, designated as Civil No. 
C85-6773, against Burke, ABE, Maxwell and others, claiming that 
Burke and Maxwell committed fraud by obtaining declarations in the 
Decree that (1) the Pepperwood Property was not part of the marital 
estate; and (2) ABE was not Burke's alter ego. 
118. In her Complaint Wade sought to set aside a transfer of 
the Pepperwood Property from ABE to Maxwell as a fraudulent 
conveyance, and to obtain an order declaring that Maxwell held 
one-half of the Pepperwood Property in constructive trust for the 
benefit of Wade. 
21 
Page 74 
available right now, I don't honestly know, 
Q As you sit here today, can you give me 
any estimate as to how much money you paid John 
Caine or his firm during the time they represented 
you or your company? 
A Oh, I have no idea as to the amount. 
Q I want to shift to what's going to be 
called the Pepperwood case where you had your 
deposition taken and that is the case of Wade 
versus Burke C-87-2491. Do you know which case I'm 
talking about? Let me rephrase that last thing, 
Mr, Burke. I believe that Sandra Maxwell had her 
deposition taken in the case of C-85-6773 called 
Patricia Wade versus Richard Burke, Sandra Maxwell, 
the Fishers and others. Do you understand that to 
be what has been entitled the Pepperwood 
litigation? That's different from where your 
deposition was taken. It's a different case than 
what your deposition was taken. 
A Why would that be a different case? 
MR. HAGEN: I don't know. I don't 
know. Just answer the questions as best you can. 
MR. KAY: I will just represent for the 
record that your amended complaint on page 21, 
paragraph 117 when it talks about the Pepperwood 
1 action, talks about the case entitled C-85-6773. 
2 MR, HAGEN: Which paragraph again of 
3 the complaint? 
41 MR. KAY: Paragraph 117 on page 21. I 
5 just want to make sure we're all talking about the 
6 same thing. 
7 MR. HAGEN: 6773. That's this one. 
81 Okay. 
9 Q (BY MR. KAY) Do you recall that case, 
10 the case regarding the Pepperwood property? And 
11 it's paragraph 117 of your amended complaint. 
12 A Yes, I do. I'm kind of confused as to 
13 why there's a different number --
14 Q My understanding --
15 A -- on this one. 
16 Q My understanding, and I'm not certain 
17 about this, Mr. Burke, but I understand there were 
18 two pieces of litigation going on and there may 
19 have been some agreement that the depositions in 
20 both cases could be used for each case because he 
21 talked some of them about the same subject matter. 
22 A Boy, that's certainly not an agreement 
23 I ever made. 
24 Q Well, I don't know if that's accurate 
25 or not, Mr. Burke. All I'm trying to do is we're 
ATTACHMENT 5 
46 
No. 3 was marked for 
identification.) 
Q (BY MR. KAY) I'm going to hand you 
what's been marked as Exhibit 3 to your 
deposition. Can you tell me what that is, 
Mrs. Maxwell? Do you know what Exhibit 3 is? 
A A Warranty Deed. 
Q At some point after May of 1983, did 
you transfer your interest in the Pepperwood 
property to a corporation called Trendland, Inc.? 
A Yes. 
Q And was that approximately September 
23rd, 1987? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q Did you sign this deed and have it 
notarized on September 23rd, 1987? 
A Yes. 
Q That is your signature under the date? 
A Yes. 
Q Why did you transfer this property 
through Exhibit 3, the Warranty Deed to Trendland, 
Inc. in September of 1987? 
A Well, we had hopes of developing the 
piece of property. 
Q Who is we? 
Transcribe America 
A Myself and the -- myself principally. 
MR. KIPP: I'm not able to hear you. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 
MR. HAGEN: Do you want to repeat. 
Q (BY MR. KAY) Let me ask the question 
again. Why did you transfer the Pepperwood 
property to Trendland, Inc. in September of 1987? 
A We had hopes of developing the piece of 
property-
Q And when you say we, are you only 
referring to yourself or someone else? 
A Well, primarily, at first myself. 
Q What was Trendland, Inc.? 
A It was a corporation. 
Q Is this a corporation that you were an 
officer in? 
A No, I had primarily most of the -- the 
majority -- I shouldn't say most, I should say the 
majority of the stock in Trendland. 
Q Were you an officer or director in 
Trendland at the time that you conveyed the 
Pepperwood property to Trendland in September of 
1987? 
A I don't believe so, no. 
Q How much money were you paid by 
Transcribe America 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Okay, when? 
A Well, I don't know the exact time that 
he first started to represent me, I don't know, 
thought it was in 1978 sometime. 
Q Do you have any explanation why your 
wife's attorney sent you a Motion for Sanctions on 
December 14, 1978 instead of sending it to John 
Caine? 
A I don't know the answer to that. 
Q We were talking about the Pepperwood 
case before lunch, Mr. Burke, and I believe you 
said that Trendland paid the property taxes on 
Pepperwood; is that correct? 
A Trendland paid the rollback taxes on 
the Pepperwood property. 
Q Of approximately $30,000? 
A Approximately. I don't know the exact 
amount. 
Q How did the Trendland Corporation come 
about? Whose idea was it? 
A Well, it was Sandra Maxwell's. She 
wanted the property into a corporation which would 
take some of the pressure off her, and she also 
wanted to have it in a vehicle for future 
Transcribe America 
development. So it was because of that that I 
initially started Trendland and we had the property 
put into Trendland. 
Q Can you tell me how putting the 
Pepperwood property in a corporation was going to 
take pressure off of Sandra Maxwell? 
A Well # she wouldn't directly own the 
property any more, not directly. She would 
indirectly because she was such a large 
stockholder, she could receive stock from the 
corporation from putting the property into it. 
Q What did Sandra Maxwell get for putting 
vtj the Pepperwood property into the Trendland 
j4 Corporation? 
:jif A Shares of stock. 
jjf Q And what were the shares of stock of 
ff Trendland worth when she put the property into it? 
|t A Well, the shares of stock would have to 
U be set up as to the value or were set up as to the 
20 value of the property at the time that she put the 
9' 
21 property in, and I don't recall what that value was 
22 at that time at all. 
23 Q Okay, the incorporators of Trendland, 
24 Inc. were Richard Burke, Maury Burke and Pamela 
25 Reichert; is that correct? 
TranScribe America 
C800) 833-0288 / (202) 842-4602 
a director? 
MR. HAGEN: I'm going to object, 
foundation. I don't think he can testify as to 
g what his sister knows. 
THE WITNESS: I really can't. I don't 
g know that. 
- Q (BY MR. KAY) Was your sister the only 
I shareholder of Trendland, Inc.? 
* A No. The other people that came in as 
j£ officers and directors were given shares of stock 
il in the corporation. 
j2 Q How many shares of stock was your 
13 sister given when Trendland, Inc. was formed? 
j4 A I believe it was 50,000. 
15 Q How many shares were you given? 
\£ A I wasn't given any. 
j7 Q How many shares were any of the other 
Is officers or directors given? 
$9 A At the time the corporation was formed, 
there was none given out. 
Q At any time after the corporation was 
formed, were any of the officers or directors given 
shares in Trendland, Inc.? 
A Yes, they were. 
Q Were you given any? 
Transcribe America 
(800) 8330288 / (202) 842-4602 
1111 14th Street, NW. Fourth Floor / Washington, DC 20005-5650 
.M. Fee Paid}. 




Dep. Book- P«tt_ 
Addreu. 
SANDRA L. HAXWELL, A WOMAN 
of Ogden, County of 
CONVEY Md WARRANT to 
TRENDLANO INC. 
WARRANTY DEED 
County of Weber 
Ref.!_ 
frtntor 
Sate of Utah, hereby 
of SALT LAKE CITY County SALT LAKE 
for the turn of Ten dol lars and other good and valuable consideration 
grantee 
, State of Utah 
DOLLARS 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
County, 
The South 396 feet of the Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 22; the South 396 feet of the East one-half of 
the Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
Section 22; the North 264 feet of the Southeast quarter of the Northwest 
quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 22; and North 264 feet of the 
East one-half of the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 22, Township 3 South, Range 1 East. SLB&M 
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record, or 
enforceable In law or equity. 
1 c9-
3 3 ^ 
* C 2 9 0 1 0 
11 SEPTEttER 87 C<:*l F1J 
K A T I E L . D I X O N 
RECORDED SALT l t t£ COUNTTi UTAH 
TKENDIAMD IMC. 
T.O. BOX **30 SIC» UT t* \U 
R£C BY: RE8EICA G*Af , DEPUTY 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , thit * ^ day 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH 
v C O \<*\ 
of * ! rj \Z\[ 
My Commisrion Expirca: 
ss. 
appeared before roe s-yu / . *^^ 
A D . 1 9 ^ personally 
the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged 









1 Q And wouldn't you expect that you'd talk 
2 to him about how he was going to get paid? 
3 A I probably did, but I don't remember 
4 the conversation in regards to that, 
5 Q All right. But it was clear that your 
6 communications were on behalf of your sister to 
7 establish a lawyer/client relationship between him 
8 and his firm and your sister? That's true, isn't 
9 it? 
10 A That's correct, 
11 Q When you first talked to Mr. Ennenga, I 
12 guess from what you said, it was briefly on the 
13 telephone, do I have that right? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And then did you meet with him? 
16 A Yes, I believe I did. 
17 Q Where? 
18 A Up in his office. 
19 Q Who was present? 
20 A He and I were the only two people 
21 there, and in briefly going over this, he says, I'd 
22 like to introduce you to John Adams and he will be 
23 representing your sister. And then as I remember, 
24 he took me in and introduced me to John Adams. 
25 Q John was a member of the firm at that 
1 time, also, as far as you knew? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Was there anything written down about 
41 what you were hiring him to do or what the 
5 arrangements were between them as lawyers and their 
61 client? 
7 A I don't believe there was any written 
8 contract, no. 
9 Q Was there a discussion of what their 
10 rate would be or how they'd charge their fees? 
11 MR. HAGEN: Objection, asked and 
12 answered. 
13 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I don't recall 
14 that, if there was. 
15 MR. KIPP: I think you're right. I 
16 was just following that along. 
17 Q (BY MR. KIPP) Did you discuss with him 
18 what specific tasks you had in mind the... dealing 
19 with for her? 
20 A Well, nothing specific other than that 
21 she needed representation on this case. 
22 Q She has told us she produced all the 
23 documents she had. Do you have any contrary 
24 information? 
25 A No, to my knowledge, she had produced 
1 all the documents. 
2 Q All right. Did you review in any 
3 detail with Mr. Ennenga or Mr. Adams the history of 
41 this case or the problems and difficulties? 
5 A I must have done. I mean gone into a 
6 little bit of depth because they had to have an 
7 understanding of the case. I don't recall, you 
8 know, specifically, you know, what was said by my 
9 part or by their part, but I'm sure we had a 
10 general conversation as to the nature of the case 
11 and what was involved. 
12 Q How long did you talk with them? 
13 A I met with John on several different 
14 occasions. 
15 Q Well, let's talk about before August 
16 15th. How many times did you meet with either or 
17 both of them? 
18 A I believe I met with John just one 
19 time. I may have had a telephone conversation with 
20 him once or twice prior to August 15th, but I think 
21 that I only met with him once but I'm not a hundred 
22 percent certain that was. 
23 Q The best memory is, though, you had one 
24 meeting which we've been talking about, with 
25 Ennenra and he introduced to you Adams before the 
15th hearing; isn't that true? 
A That's correct. 
Q How long did that meeting last? 
A Oh, boy, I just don't have a rough idea 
on time. 
Q Well, a minute, a day? 
A Probably more than an hour and maybe 
less than two hours. 
Q All right. Did you take any pleadings 
with you? 
A I don't remember if I did or I didn't. 
I figure I must have done, though. He had to have 
knowledge of the case. 
Q But you don't have any specific memory 
of that? 
A I don't. 
Q Did you discuss the August 15th 
hearing? 
A John called me up the same day of that 
hearing. He called me up later that same morning. 
Q I've asked that before. I'm going to 
talk about that. I'd like to talk about the time 
frame before they said, hear ye, hear ye, down at 
the courthouse. I intend to direct your attention 
to that time frame. Besides the meeting you've 
1 told me about, did you talk to Adams or Ennenga 
2 about the August 15th hearing before the hearing 
3 commenced? 
4 A Yes, I talked to John about that and he 
5 was aware of it because -- now, my best memory is 
6 that Randy Richards or John Caine, one of the two 
7 of them sent them down a notice of that hearing. 
8 Q Do you recall anything specifically 
9 that was said in the conversation with him about 
10 the hearing? 
11 A Not specifically, no. 
12 Q All right. Now, I'd like to kind of 
13 summarize, here you are, you've had this meeting, 
14 you've talked to Ennenga, he's introduced you to 
15 Adams, you talked to both of them for the period of 
16 time you described. What understanding did you 
17 reach about what they were going to do? 
18 A That John Adams was going to represent 
19 my sister in this case. 
20 Q There wasn't any question or any 
21 conflict check involved or any investigation to be 
22 done? 
23 A Not to my knowledge, there wasn't. If 
24 there was, it was done, you know, outside of what I 
25 was involved. 
ATTACHMENT 7 
u A Yes. 
2 Q My question, though, before this was, 
3 did you ever tell him that you had deeded the 
4 Pepperwood property to a corporation? 
5 A No, I had not at that point in time. 
6 Q Randy Richards appeared for you, made 
7 an entry of appearance in the Pepperwood case on 
8 December 2nd, 1987. And your deposition was taken 
9 on June 16th, 1988. So I assume this first meeting 
10 is sometime between December 2nd, 1987 and June of 
11 '88. And I think your best memory is it was maybe 
12 three or four months before the deposition; is that 
13 correct? 
14 A As much as I can recall, yeah. 
15 Q Did you not convey the property in 
16 September of 1987, the Pepperwood property from 
17 yourself to Trendland, Inc., in September of 1987? 
18 A I did. 
19 Q And so by the first time you ever met 
20 Randy Richards, you were not the record owner of 
21 the Pepperwood property; correct? 
22 A I was under the impression as far as a 
23 chronological date that I had met him beforehand, 
24 as far as I could remember. 
25 Q Well, I want you to go by your memory, 
Page 136 
but I also want you to know that up until October 
30, 1987, you were represented from September 25th 
1987 to October 30, 1987 by Kay Lewis and Bruce 
Shapiro, and before that time, you were represented 
by Roy Moore up until September 15th, 1987. 
A Uh-huh. 
Q So it just seems to me that September 
23rd of '87 is before December. I'm not going to 
argue with you. 
MR. KIPP: You mean any more than 
that? 
MR. KAY: What? 
MR. KIPP: Nothing. 
THE WITNESS: No, my memory is that 
when I met Randy, that this had not happened yet. 
Q (BY MR. KAY) Prior to the date of the 
deposition on June 16th, 1988, had you ever told 
Randy Richards that you had deeded the Pepperwood 
property to Trendland, Inc.? 
A Right around that period of time was 
when the corporation was being set up. What had 
happened in as far as the sequence of the 
corporation being created, I'm not sure of what 
time frame that was in when the deposition was 
going on. I knew it was in the process, but I 
1 A Yes, yes. 
2 Q And as you sat down to eat, was there a 
3 bank of phones right near your table? 
4 A Not then. The phone conversation or me 
5 trying to reach my brother happened before we 
61 walked across the street. 
7 Q And so was that in the building that 
8 you had the deposition in? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And was there any discussion between 
11 you and Randy before you called your brother? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And that was when you told -- is that 
14 when you talked about the $30,000 problem? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Did you say anything to Randy before 
17 you called your brother, regarding Trendland, 
18 Inc.? 
19 A I believe that as far as Mr. Larsen 
20 brought it up in the deposition something to the 
21 effect of having the corporation being in 
22 existence. 
23 Q you remember Mr. Larsen asking you 
24
 questions about whether there was a corporation 
25
 that you had deeded the property to? 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q My question is, did you ever have a 
3 conversation with Randy before you called your 
4 brother, where you told him that there was a 
5 corporation called Trendland, Inc. that the 
6 property was deeded to? 
7 A I believe Randy told me. 
8 Q It's your testimony that Randy told you 
9 the name of the corporation you deeded the 
10 corporation to? 
11 A That he was aware of the existence of 
12 one, yes and I had told him the same thing that I 
13 said during the deposition, I knew there was one in 
14 the process of being formed, but I literally don't 
15 know what steps it takes to form a corporation. I 
16 don't know how long a time frame you're speaking 
17 of. 
18 Q Before the noon break, on the day of 
19 your deposition, did you know the name of the 
20 corporation that you understood was being formed? 
21 A I believe I did. 
22 Q Did y O U have any discussion with Randy 
*3| about the name of the corporation during the lunch 
hour? 
A I d o n ' t know i f I s p e c i f i c a l l y named 
24 
25 
